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INTRODUCTION1.
Agricultural commercialisation occurs when agricultural 
enterprises and/or the agricultural sector as a whole 
rely increasingly on the market for the sale of produce 
and for the acquisition of production inputs, including 
labour. It is an integral and critical part of the process 
of structural transformation (see section 1.1), through 
which a growing economy transitions, over a period of 
several decades or more: 
•	 from one where the majority of the population 
live in rural areas and depend directly or 
indirectly on semi-subsistence agriculture for 
an important part of their livelihood
•	 to one where the majority of the population 
live in urban areas and depend on 
employment in manufacturing or service 
industries for the major part of their livelihood.
As such, agricultural commercialisation is an 
endogenous process that interacts with developments 
in others sectors of the economy and whose impacts 
depend critically on conditions in those other sectors. It 
proceeds via the decisions of numerous private agents 
– farmers, input suppliers, traders and processors. 
However, these can also be influenced by purposive 
investments by public and social actors (states, donors, 
non-governmental organisations (NGOs), foundations). 
For analytical purposes, these investments can be 
considered as exogenous initiatives to promote 
commercialisation.
Agricultural commercialisation is encouraged by 
growing demand both for agricultural products (food, 
raw materials supplies for agro-industries) and for 
workers within growing urban centres. However, 
agricultural commercialisation can also contribute to 
the process of structural transformation in the wider 
economy by:
•	 increasing the supplies of food that are 
marketed for consumption by urban 
consumers, thereby keeping prices down 
(making wage labour in manufacturing and 
service industries more competitive) or 
reducing reliance on imports (economising on 
scarce foreign exchange)
•	 increasing foreign exchange earnings 
through sale of export commodities, thereby 
facilitating acquisition of imported capital 
equipment for manufacturing
•	 providing a source of tax revenue for public 
investment, although too much taxation is 
likely to choke the process of agricultural 
commercialisation
•	 releasing labour for employment in 
other sectors of the economy, insofar as 
commercialisation is associated with rising 
labour productivity in agricultural production.
Our definition of agricultural commercialisation 
encompasses two contrasting commercialisation 
dynamics. The first of these occurs when smallholder 
farm households shift from semi-subsistence agriculture 
to production primarily for the market – in the process 
coming to rely increasingly on purchased inputs and 
perhaps also labour in their production. However, 
their scale of production remains small, due primarily 
to high demand for land among people who have yet 
to obtain more remunerative and reasonably secure 
employment in the non-farm economy. The second 
dynamic occurs when smallholder farm households 
are complemented or replaced by medium- or large-
scale farm enterprises that are predominantly or purely 
commercial in nature. Ultimately, as the structural 
transformation proceeds, this second dynamic will be 
observed as the natural outcome of market forces, 
unless social and political resistance seeks to preserve 
a class of small (primarily part-time) farmers through a 
regime of subsidies. However, larger farm enterprises 
may also be established earlier in the process of 
structural transformation, as people with capital and/
or political connections use these to gain access to 
high-potential land. Such enterprises can contribute to 
the process of structural transformation in all the ways 
listed above. However, the distributional consequences 
of this second type of agricultural commercialisation 
during the early stages of the structural transformation 
can be expected to be different from (and generally less 
benign than) the impacts of the first.
In this paper we draw on existing literature to consider 
these different types of agricultural commercialisation. 
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For each, we consider the conditions in other sectors 
of the economy and polity that stimulate agricultural 
commercialisation and mediate its impacts, as 
well as public policy actions that might encourage 
commercialisation, its potential benefits, and the likely 
configuration of winners and losers. We observe that 
both the dynamics and the impacts of agricultural 
commercialisation differ according to whether the 
commercialisation in question occurs early or late 
within the process of structural transformation or, 
more specifically, before or after the so-called ‘Lewis 
turning point’ (see section 1.1). We also observe that 
the impacts depend on whether the commercialisation 
in question occurs in areas of low or high population 
density.1 The final section of the report discusses the 
measurement of agricultural commercialisation in the 
light of this review. 
The paper begins, however, with a brief discussion of the 
process of structural transformation within an economy, 
followed by consideration of semi-subsistence farm 
households, as these are the starting point from which 
agricultural commercialisation proceeds.
1.1  The structural transformation
The structural transformation refers to the historic shift 
in the balance of economic activity and labour input 
as a growing economy transitions from one where the 
majority of the population live in rural areas and depend 
directly or indirectly on semi-subsistence agriculture 
for an important part of their livelihood, to one where 
the majority of the population live in urban areas and 
depend on employment in manufacturing or service 
industries for the major part of their livelihood.2 
As conceived by Lewis (1954), a dynamic industrial 
sector gradually draws surplus labour out of semi-
subsistence agriculture, which performs a social 
protection role as well as a productive one in the 
absence of other sources of economic activity. 
Productivity growth in agriculture is valuable for staving 
off food crises, but rural wages only rise slowly while 
there remains surplus labour in rural areas. However, a 
turning point is reached when the quantity of additional 
labour demanded by the growing manufacturing/ 
urban sector exceeds the increase in population due 
to population growth, and the rural population begins 
to fall. At this point – which we refer to in this paper 
as the ‘Lewis turning point’ – the segmented rural and 
urban labour markets rapidly integrate, and rural wages 
begin to rise sharply to more closely approximate urban 
wages. This has profound effects on agrarian structure 
and the nature of agricultural production.
This paper argues that a movement of labour out of 
semi-subsistence agriculture is an inevitable part of 
the economic development process. This is because 
a preponderance of labour in rural areas restricts the 
average size of farm holding, and a smallholder farm 
of 1–2 hectares simply cannot generate medium, let 
alone high, incomes for the members of the smallholder 
farm household. To the extent that governments are 
willing to subsidise smallholder farm incomes through 
public transfers, then some smallholdings can remain. 
Some continue to exist as part-time or ‘hobby’ farms. 
However, as both contributor to and consequence 
of rising average incomes in an economy, many poor 
people leave rural areas and their agriculture-related 
livelihoods to seek employment in urban areas. Once 
the Lewis turning point has been passed, this permits 
consolidation of landholdings and rising incomes per 
person for those who remain in agriculture.
Nevertheless, multiple possible trajectories for the 
structural transformation are possible and there may 
be twists and reversals within these. As classically 
conceived, it is the growth of manufacturing that 
drives the expansion of the urban economy (Mellor 
1986; Lewis 1954). However, recent literature (Gollin 
et al. 2013; Jedwab 2013) argues that some forms 
of agricultural commercialisation may stimulate 
urbanisation without encouraging increased production 
of tradable manufacturing and services products. They 
use the term ‘consumption cities’ to describe urban 
areas where the available employment is predominantly 
in non-tradable service sectors. Gollin et al. (2013) 
argue that economies dominated by consumption cities 
will grow more slowly than economies with dynamic 
industrial sectors, and they characterise the rise of 
consumption cities as ‘urbanisation without structural 
transformation’.3 An alternative interpretation of the 
same phenomenon is that this is a different trajectory 
for the structural transformation from that envisaged by 
Lewis (1954) – one that is most likely to be observed 
in countries with an abundant endowment of natural 
resources, although policy also has an important role 
to play in shaping the trajectory. If Gollin et al. (2013) 
are right about the slower aggregate growth rate, then 
the rate at which structural transformation (i.e. the shift 
of labour out of semi-subsistence agriculture) proceeds 
will also be slower.
Another critical aspect of the structural transformation 
process is the mechanism by which labour is moved 
out of semi-subsistence agriculture. Lewis (1954) 
envisaged a demand pull from a dynamic industrial 
sector. However, in some countries – for example, in 
Latin America and southern Africa – smallholder farm 
households have been forcibly displaced from their 
land by large, settler farms. These and other policies 
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that have the effect of limiting the viability of agriculture-
based livelihoods thereby push labour towards urban 
areas. Lack of opportunity in rural areas depresses 
the wages that migrants are willing to accept in urban 
areas, hence generating a supply of cheap labour for 
manufacturing and service industries. Where land is 
more plentiful and the rate of labour absorption in urban 
areas is modest, smallholder and large-scale farms may 
co-exist for decades or even centuries.
Timmer (2009) emphasises that different trajectories 
for the structural transformation have very different 
outcomes in terms of inequality. Balanced growth 
– which combines public investment in support of
smallholder agriculture with promotion of labour-
intensive industrialisation – generates the most equitable 
outcomes throughout the structural transformation. 
By contrast, promotion of capital-intensive industries 
reduces the rate of labour absorption per unit of 
manufacturing output and increases inequality between 
the owners of capital and those in manufacturing 
employment on the one hand and those in other 
sectors of the economy, including agriculture, on the 
other. Policies that limit the viability of smallholder 
agriculture-based livelihoods exacerbate inequality 
between urban and rural areas, but this inequality is 
also likely to be perpetuated within urban areas over 
time as vulnerable migrants are pushed towards urban 
areas with minimal reservation positions in any wage 
bargaining. Such inequalities, once established, may 
perpetuate themselves for generations.
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SEMI-SUbSISTENCE fARM 
HOUSEHOLDS
2.
At the start of the structural transformation, the majority 
of rural households have some entitlement to land and 
depend to a greater or lesser extent on agricultural 
production for their livelihoods. Under traditional tenure 
systems in Africa, most households have their own use 
rights to parcels of land – i.e. there are few landless 
households dependent entirely on rental for their access 
to land. However, access to land is far from equal and, 
as population densities rise in particular countries and in 
regions within countries, the landholdings of the poorest 
households are becoming increasingly inadequate to 
support even the most basic standard of living (Jayne 
et al. 2014; 2003). These tensions notwithstanding, 
rural areas continue to act as a reservoir for people 
without employment in the formal economy (Timmer 
2009). Although some urban areas are growing 
rapidly, the rate of overall population growth means 
that rural populations continue to rise. In the absence 
of employment opportunities in the formal economy, 
access to land and common property resources (e.g. 
water resources, grazing lands, woodlands, wild foods) 
provides some basis for subsistence, even if income 
and consumption flows from such resources have to 
be supplemented by earnings from other activities (Ellis 
2000; Scoones 1998; Reardon 1997). Local kinship 
networks provide a degree of informal social protection, 
increasingly supplemented by resource flows from 
family members who have migrated (on a short- or 
long-term basis) to other areas, both rural and urban 
(Jayne et al. 2014).
Under these conditions, agricultural production 
tends to be semi-subsistence. Within particular 
regions or districts, many households produce similar 
combinations of crops, limiting the potential for intra-
local trade (Binswanger and McIntire 1987; Binswanger 
and Rosenzweig 1986), although those with above-
average resource endowments may sell surplus 
production to deficit households. At the start of the 
structural transformation, urban demand is limited by 
the size of urban populations as well as by distance 
and the poor quality of infrastructure, which reduce the 
profitability of trade. While export supply chains exist 
for some commodities, the number of such chains is 
limited by low farm productivity and the poor quality 
of infrastructure, which reduce competitiveness in 
international markets. Poulton et al. (2008) found that 
African countries have achieved agricultural export 
competitiveness primarily in medium- to high-value 
crops either where competition is limited by agro-
ecological conditions (e.g. cocoa, tea) or where the 
labour intensity of production enables African producers 
to exploit low-cost labour (family or hired) to offset the 
competitive disadvantages from factors such as high 
transport costs (e.g. cotton, horticulture). Perhaps not 
surprisingly, the volume of such exports grows only 
slowly (Diao et al. 2003); faster-growing markets are 
likely to attract research and investment from more 
potential competitors.
Semi-subsistence households devote a portion (often 
the majority) of their land to relatively low-value crops 
that they consume themselves. The alternative – to 
produce higher-value crops for sale, then use the income 
generated to buy food crops for home consumption – is 
rendered unattractive by two factors:
•	 The high transport and/or transaction costs 
associated with both selling and buying crops, 
such that the benefits of producing higher-
value crops are wiped out by the high costs of 
trading (Jayne 1994).
•	 The volatility of food prices across and within 
seasons, such that farmers fear encountering 
high prices for staple foods when the time 
comes for them to buy them (Fafchamps 
1992).
Both of these factors point to the importance of increasing 
the efficiency, including stability, of food markets in any 
strategy to promote agricultural commercialisation. 
Very poor households who are heavily reliant on their 
own production for their food needs, especially under 
unpredictable rainfed conditions, tend to favour a 
diversity of locally adapted, often somewhat drought 
tolerant, crop varieties. These, however, are often also 
inherently low yielding. 
Meanwhile, production of low-value commodities on 
small parcels of land generates small, often negligible, 
surpluses that make it difficult for the household to cover 
the basic cash requirements for daily living, even when 
supplemented by non-farm earnings. Some crop sales 
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by poor semi-subsistence households are, therefore, 
not sales of surplus, but so-called ‘distress’ sales to 
meet immediate cash needs, even if the household then 
has to buy in quantities of the same crop a few months 
later, when prices are higher. 
Under these conditions, there are few cash resources 
available to invest in agricultural production (improved 
seeds, fertilisers, crop protection chemicals, animal 
traction, irrigation technology, etc.), so productivity 
remains low. Unpredictable rainfed conditions also 
increase the risk of investing in cash inputs, so may 
discourage intensification, especially when cash is very 
scarce.
What many (though not all) poor households do have is 
available family labour. Labour is likely to be ‘abundant’ 
(read ‘under-utilised’) where plot sizes are small due 
to high population densities, and where opportunities 
for off-farm employment are limited. At the start of the 
structural transformation, employment opportunities 
in urban areas are limited, while opportunities within 
the rural non-farm economy are restricted by the 
low demand for non-farm goods and services from 
poor agricultural households (Haggblade et al. 2007; 
Reardon 1997).
Hence, many semi-subsistence households make 
intensive use of family labour on their farms, often 
applying it beyond the point at which its marginal 
productivity equals the prevailing casual wage rate. 
Some do also hire in labour at times of peak demand, 
but this labour is more likely to be employed such that 
marginal productivity equals the prevailing casual wage 
rate. The willingness of family labour to ‘self-exploit’ 
in the absence of alternative productive opportunities, 
combined with the low monitoring costs associated 
with family labour in household fields, means that 
smallholder households can still compete with more 
sophisticated and capital-intensive commercial farms 
in some agricultural output markets, despite their 
disadvantageous position with respect to both capital 
and information (Poulton et al. 2010; Binswanger and 
Rosenzweig 1986). Where competitiveness is achieved 
through self-exploitation, however, it is almost by 
definition not associated with affluence.
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SMALLHOLDER 
COMMERCIALISATION
3.
As urban populations grow, demand for marketed 
agricultural products increases. Infrastructure investment 
– also associated with the structural transformation – 
reduces the costs of transporting agricultural produce 
from rural to urban areas, encouraging smallholder 
farmers to increase their marketed output in response 
to this increased demand, often perhaps in competition 
with imports. The World Bank (Byerlee et al. 2013) 
estimates that Africa’s total domestic demand for food 
is just over $300bn per year and this figure is expected 
to triple by 2030. If urban areas now account for around 
40 percent of Africa’s population (World Development 
Indicators 2017), then this equates to perhaps $150bn 
of food consumption per year. By contrast, agricultural 
exports are worth around $60bn per year (Ibid.), some 
of which feed urban populations in neighbouring African 
countries.
Rising demand for final products also encourages 
commercial private investments in agricultural supply 
chains, from input supply through petty trading to 
processing, all of which may facilitate commercialisation 
by smallholder producers (Byerlee et al. 2013). For 
example, firms with processing capacity may support 
nearby smallholders to produce the varieties and 
qualities of the crops that they want, through input 
credit and/or extension advice, as well as simply 
creating additional local demand for those crops.
Purposive public and social investments can also seek 
to facilitate agricultural commercialisation at the local 
level by, for example:
•	 enhancing the information that smallholder 
households have regarding market 
opportunities, prices for different crops, etc.
•	 facilitating linkages between smallholders and 
buyers
•	 organising smallholders into groups or 
cooperatives and training them to target new 
market outlets
•	 providing finance to fund upgrading 
investments that enable smallholders to meet 
requirements of particular market channels
•	 organising certification schemes where 
required
•	 supporting the expansion of input supply 
networks by providing business training or 
credit guarantees for emerging entrepreneurs 
and introducing them to distributors
•	 pursuing policies (at the national level) to 
ensure greater stability in staple food prices.
Some of these investments will combine initiatives to 
link smallholders to new and/or remunerative marketing 
channels with initiatives to raise farmer productivity 
in response to these expanded opportunities. These 
might encompass:
•	 access to new technologies such as improved 
seed varieties, fertilisers, improved methods 
for crop protection, technologies for storage 
or primary processing. Initiatives to enhance 
access may include exposure through 
demonstrations, etc. and credit schemes to 
facilitate uptake.
•	 provision of technical knowledge to raise 
yields to remunerative levels, manage pests 
or drought, etc. as well as how to meet the 
quality and other requirements of new market 
channels.
Of course, not all initiatives to promote commercialisation 
will be successful. Consistent with our opening 
definition, commercialisation occurs where either:
•	 a household increases its total agricultural 
production and most of the incremental 
production is marketed, such that the share of 
its total output that is marketed rises4 
•	 a household increases its production of 
crops that are marketed and makes space for 
this – given land or labour constraints – by 
reducing the land or labour that it devotes 
to food production for own consumption. 
This is a more significant change than the 
previous situation, in so far as it implies 
a greater reliance on markets for food 
purchase. It may indicate that there has been 
a systemic improvement in the functioning 
of food markets over time, which is good for 
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agricultural commercialisation. Of 11 studies 
analysed by von Braun and Kennedy (1994), 
only in two did food production for home 
consumption decline when market-oriented 
production increased.5 In the four central 
Tanzanian villages studied by Mutabazi et 
al. (2013), however, more commercialised 
households devoted less land to cereals 
production for home consumption, relying on 
food purchases from neighbouring farmers 
with surpluses to spare.
Note that initiatives that lead households to expand 
production of one cash crop at the expense of another 
do not constitute commercialisation; this just entails 
switching between cash crops as opportunities 
change. A medium-term perspective (5+ years) may be 
necessary to observe that one cash crop has declined, 
for whatever reason, and then been replaced with a lag 
by another one.
Similarly, not all initiatives to promote agricultural 
commercialisation prove to be sustainable. Marketed 
output may rise during the time that a project actively 
facilitates production and/or links to market, but decline 
again once this support is withdrawn.
3.1  Who participates in early   
 smallholder commercialisation? 
This is an important question for APRA’s research; the 
nature of agricultural commercialisation, alongside the 
existing literature, suggest some starting hypotheses.
On balance, one would expect households that live 
closer to urban centres to commercialise more quickly 
than those that live further away. Proximity to the 
market increases access to information and perhaps 
the ability to establish linkages with particular buyers. 
Lower transport costs increase the benefits from sale 
to market, while food prices may also be more stable 
than in remoter areas. (Large urban centres tend to be 
supplied from multiple production zones, which spreads 
risk.) Competition for land is higher closer to urban 
centres and land rights may be more individualised 
(Platteau 1996). This may encourage those with land to 
either increase the returns that they realise from it or to 
sell or rent it to others.
However, the nature of the crop is an important 
mediating factor here. It is common to find high-return 
but perishable crops such as various horticultural 
products grown in peri-urban areas. However, other 
crops grown primarily for market may require more land 
or particular agro-ecological conditions and this will 
affect overall patterns of commercialisation. In central 
Ghana, Nin-Pratt and McBride (2014) find that the 
locus of cocoa production has gradually shifted to less 
densely populated areas, while closer to major urban 
centres cassava is one of the major crops. Much of this 
cassava is grown for own consumption on small plots 
by households who value the high returns that it gives 
to both land and labour, not least because their major 
livelihood activities (hence labour use) are within the 
urban economy. By contrast, in northern Ghana, yam 
production (one of the main crops grown predominantly 
for market) is practised in areas of medium-to-low 
population density, as soil fertility remains high in these 
areas (while some crop rotation and fallowing remain 
possible) and labour costs are cheap (Ibid.).
The study of onion production villages in central Tanzania 
by Mutabazi et al. (2013) shows that exceptions to 
many rules are possible. These villages are 170–240km 
from Morogoro and 350–420km from Dar es Salaam. 
They have developed as centres of onion production 
due to local irrigation investment and through networks 
of Pemban diaspora. Consistent with expectations, 
however, Mutabazi et al. found that commercialisation 
levels were higher in the two villages with better 
connections to the main highway to Morogoro and Dar 
es Salaam.
Our starting assumption is also that wealthier 
households are likely to commercialise ahead of 
poorer households. This is neatly captured in the 
notion of ‘three rural worlds’ (Vorley 2002), whereby it 
is the minority of farmers in ‘rural world 1’ who readily 
accommodate themselves to the changing dynamics of 
agricultural markets and value chains. There are at least 
three reasons why better-off African smallholders might 
be able to raise the proportion of their output that they 
sell to market more readily than their poorer neighbours:
•	 They have more land (per household 
member), so can satisfy their subsistence 
food needs and still devote some land to 
production for market. This ‘both–and’ 
approach is sensible where food markets 
remain volatile. By contrast, if households with 
small landholdings wish to commercialise, 
they either have to rely on food markets for 
their own consumption requirements or to 
simultaneously intensify their food production 
practices so as to free up limited pieces of 
land on which to grow higher-value crops for 
market. Both are risky strategies and the latter 
will almost certainly need external financial 
and technical support (Poulton and Ndufa 
2005).
•	 They have more capital to invest in expanding 
production or improving production practices. 
Production expansion can be achieved 
through intensification (e.g. applying more 
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fertiliser) or extensification, according to 
circumstances. 
•	 They are better able to bear risk, due to 
their higher incomes and asset base. The 
risks associated with commercialisation 
are numerous and linked to experimenting 
with new crops, varieties, production 
techniques and market channels. Returns 
to smallholder agriculture, especially under 
rainfed conditions, are notoriously variable, 
but production for market adds the extra 
dimension of market and price risk. As capital 
is scarce for (most) smallholder households, 
any investment to expand production carries 
a high opportunity cost, as returns are never 
assured.
Mellor (2014) notes that it was better-off smallholders 
who drove the increase in production and, especially, 
marketed surplus during the Green Revolution in 
Asia. In turn, those smallholders employed labour and 
purchased non-tradable goods and services to the 
benefit of poorer households within their communities. 
The question then is whether, in high population density 
areas of Africa, there remain sufficient of these better-off 
smallholders to lead the agricultural commercialisation 
process. Obviously, the distribution of landholdings and 
assets varies from country to country, but Mellor argues 
that the basic answer to this question is ‘yes’.
Finally, we might expect men to engage in smallholder 
commercialisation more quickly than women, although 
this will depend on local social norms and the gendered 
division of labour. It is often observed that men seek 
to control the major sources of cash income into a 
household while women have particular responsibility 
for food provision. This may even lead to men taking 
over production of what was previously a women’s crop 
when market opportunities increase (von Braun et al. 
1994). Similarly, men may capture a disproportionate 
amount of available purchased inputs for use on their 
fields (Udry et al. 1995). Conversely, in southern Ethiopia, 
Lim et al. (2007) found that women’s bargaining power 
within a household – proxied by the share of livestock 
assets that the wife would control in the event of 
divorce – was positively (albeit weakly) correlated with 
the production of the local staple crop, enset, and 
negatively correlated with the production of coffee.
3.2  Later commercialisation of  
 smallholder production   
 systems: East Asian experience
Early smallholder commercialisation is an incremental 
process, with some households able to engage 
increasingly with markets while others (initially the 
majority) remain in semi-subsistence mode. However, 
later in the structural transformation process, and 
particularly once the Lewis turning point has been 
passed, these dynamics change radically.
Pingali (1997) summarises the experience of the first 
East Asian ‘tigers’ almost 40 years after the onset of 
the Green Revolution. During this time, the economies 
of South Korea and Taiwan had grown dramatically, and 
were now dominated by manufacturing and services. 
Labour demand in those sectors had increased to the 
point where the rural population had begun to fall. In 
these East Asian nations, with high population densities, 
Pingali observed the following significant implications 
for agricultural production:
•	 Two factors combined to drive agricultural 
mechanisation. Firstly, fewer workers were 
left to farm the available land, so capital 
was substituted for labour. Secondly, 
the only way that remaining agricultural 
households could obtain incomes that were 
remotely comparable to those available 
from employment in manufacturing and 
services was to combine their labour with 
capital, so that each worker could cultivate 
an increasingly large area of land. Labour 
power for land preparation was progressively 
replaced by animal traction (buffalo in East 
Asia), power tillers and, ultimately, tractors. 
Planting and harvesting activities were also 
eventually mechanised.
•	 Similar forces influenced the use of purchased 
inputs and services. While labour is plentiful, 
nutrients may be applied to the soil via a 
range of practices that make intensive use 
of household labour. These include manure 
application and composting. In semi-arid 
areas of Africa, termite mounds can be added 
to soil as a source of nutrients (Cavendish 
1999). As labour becomes scarcer, households 
increasingly rely on purchasing nutrients in the 
form of chemical fertilisers. Herbicides can 
also be applied to reduce the requirement for 
weeding labour.
•	 Expanding and increasingly affluent urban 
populations represented growing markets for 
agricultural produce, although the composition 
of food demand evolved over time. Demand 
for staple food grows with population, but 
may even fall slightly in per capita terms. 
Meanwhile, demand for livestock products, 
fruits and vegetables grows rapidly with rising 
incomes. The evolution of demand created 
opportunities for farmers who were able to 
observe market trends. In turn, the returns 
from responding to new opportunities enabled 
enterprising farmers to accumulate capital 
12 Working Paper 06 | November 2017
with which to purchase equipment and inputs 
and to acquire additional land as neighbours 
sold up to move to urban areas.
•	 Not all farmers were equally adept at 
identifying market opportunities, nor were 
they all equally placed to respond to them. 
Those who were unable to successfully 
commercialise their production over time, 
but who nevertheless did not migrate to 
urban areas, became wage labourers on 
the expanding farms of those who were 
commercialising.
Despite the inequality noted in the final bullet point, 
this was still a relatively benign process. Two major 
factors explain this. Firstly, it was driven by labour 
demand in the urban economy. Most labour was 
thus drawn into more remunerative employment, 
rather than being ejected from the agricultural sector 
with nowhere else to go. Secondly, as a result of land 
reform programmes following World War II, East Asia 
entered the structural transformation and agricultural 
commercialisation processes with relatively egalitarian 
landholding patterns (Mennen 2009). In turn, modest 
income increases across much of the rural population 
provided important demand for the growth of labour-
intensive manufacturing (Mellor 1986), although exports 
were also a major part of the East Asian growth story.
In this story the market conveyed the incentives for farm 
households either to exit agriculture or to consolidate 
and mechanise holdings if they remained. It also created 
opportunities for some households to accumulate 
capital that could support either of those strategies. 
Those that could not successfully implement either 
strategy ended up as wage labourers on the farms of 
others.
An important point to note, however, is that the 
systemic commercialisation of smallholder agriculture 
occurred late in the structural transformation process 
(Timmer 2009). Pingali (1997) observed that, 40 years 
or so after the start of the Green Revolution, land 
consolidation (indicated by the number and average 
size of agricultural holdings) had commenced only in 
South Korea and Taiwan. Using the indicator proposed 
in footnote 1 and data from the World Development 
Indicators database, in 1995 this indicator had a value 
of 7.25 in South Korea. By contrast, among the six 
APRA countries, the highest value is found in Ghana, 
which was only 1.25 in 2013.6 Wiggins (2017) shows an 
ongoing decline in average farm sizes across China and 
a range of countries in South-East Asia and South Asia 
(the one exception being Vietnam). In other words, land 
consolidation has yet to commence in most of Asia. 
This suggests that market-driven land consolidation is 
also still a long way off in most, if not all, of Africa.
To reiterate, in the early stages of the structural 
transformation, developments in the non-farm economy 
create opportunities for a minority of farms to do well, 
but the preponderance of under-employed labour in 
rural areas encourages a semi-subsistence orientation 
to production.
3.3  Smallholder commercialisation  
 in land-abundant areas
The conclusion of the previous section suggests that 
the potential for agricultural commercialisation is 
higher in more land-abundant areas. This argument 
assumes that agro-ecological potential is controlled 
for. If population density is low, hence land is abundant, 
because soil quality is poor and/or rainfall is low, then 
these same conditions limit the potential for (crop-based) 
agricultural commercialisation.7 For the purposes of this 
paper, therefore, we consider areas of medium or high 
agro-ecological potential with a population density of 
less than 100 persons per km2 as land-abundant.8
Where agro-ecological potential is medium or high, the 
question arises as to why an area remains relatively 
sparsely populated. Possible reasons for this include 
the following:
•	 Historically, the area has been prone to 
conflict, which has discouraged settlement 
and investment. Parts of rural Mozambique 
may provide examples of this.
•	 Historically, the area has been prone to 
diseases affecting humans and/or animals. 
Again, parts of rural Mozambique infected 
by tsetse fly may provide examples of this. 
Similarly, settlement in parts of central-north 
Ghana has historically been discouraged 
by the prevalence of river blindness 
(onchocerciasis), but effective control 
measures have been implemented since the 
1980s. Around the same time, Gokwe, in 
north-western Zimbabwe, was largely cleared 
of tsetse fly and the farmers who moved 
in contributed strongly to the expansion of 
smallholder cotton production in the country 
over the following decade. 
•	 Areas that are remote from major urban 
centres tend to suffer from poor infrastructure. 
Chamberlin et al. (2014) argue that remoteness 
combined with poor roads explains why much 
land remains uncultivated in Africa. In addition 
to road infrastructure, lack of irrigation may be 
an impediment to cultivation in areas where 
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rainfall is low but rivers do flow. Historically, 
a low water table may also have discouraged 
settlement, as people lacked the capacity 
either to store water across seasons or to 
draw water for consumption.
•	 The realisation of agro-ecological potential 
requires some form of technical ‘fix’, which 
in turn requires a substantial (and probably 
public) initial investment. The exploitation 
of the Cerrado area of Brazil, for example, 
required substantial infrastructure investment, 
but also large-scale application of lime on 
soils that were initially too acidic, plus the 
development of plant varieties that could 
tolerate seasonally high temperatures (World 
Bank 2009). It is argued that the Guinea 
savannah zone that stretches across Africa 
just above the equator then down into 
central-southern Africa could be developed 
for commercial agriculture if a similar mix of 
investments was forthcoming (Ibid.).
Where public investments do enable smallholder 
cultivation to expand in land-abundant areas of medium 
or high agro-ecological potential, the potential for 
smallholder commercialisation is high. Households with 
generous land-labour ratios can both satisfy their basic 
subsistence requirements and cultivate crops for market 
on additional plots, using animal traction and perhaps 
also hired labour where available. In Gokwe, for example, 
the top decile or so of smallholder cotton producers, 
who typically farmed 5–10 hectares of cotton, relied 
heavily on hired labour (along with animal traction) for 
the cotton production effort, with the household head 
and/or other household members primarily providing 
supervisory input. Meanwhile, food crop production is 
undertaken almost entirely with family labour (Tschirley 
et al. 2009). In such areas, the supply of hired labour 
may be seasonal, with workers migrating from other 
zones at critical times in the seasonal calendar.
The experience of resettlement farmers in other parts 
of Zimbabwe supports this argument, albeit with one 
important caveat. Whereas cotton farmers in Gokwe 
received production support (extension advice, 
seasonal input credit) from cotton companies, many 
resettlement farmers have received very little support, 
which has considerably slowed the process of asset 
accumulation and their ability to expand production 
in response to market demand (Hanlon et al. 2012; 
Scoones et al. 2012; van den Brink 2000).
Lack of public investment to facilitate smallholder 
production in land-abundant areas with medium or 
high agro-ecological potential is thus a major reason 
why more commercialised smallholder production is 
not observed in such areas. On the other hand, we 
should not assume that only smallholders will seek to 
obtain land of medium or high agro-ecological potential 
if it is possible to use this land to grow crops profitably 
for market. Recent large-scale farm expansion in 
Ghana has focused on the Brong Ahafo and Northern 
regions (Cotula et al. 2014), areas that were part of the 
onchocerciasis control efforts until the 1990s. More 
pervasively, the recent rise of medium-scale farms in 
Africa is discussed in section 5. 
3.4  The benefits of smallholder   
 commercialisation
We consider this issue at three levels: household 
(microeconomic),rural non-farm economy 
(mesoeconomic) and macroeconomic. 
At the household level, basic neoclassical economic 
theory suggests four major benefits of commercialisation. 
Firstly, production that is oriented towards the market 
can respond to remunerative (new) opportunities. 
Consumers elsewhere may be willing to pay much more 
for a product than the producers themselves are, due 
to differences in income levels, preferences, etc. The 
condition for gains being realised is that transport and 
transaction costs are lower than the price differential 
that can be achieved through trade. This emphasises 
that smallholder commercialisation is highly dependent 
on conditions outside of smallholders’ control (e.g. 
road infrastructure and market institutions that reduce 
transaction costs).
Secondly, production that is oriented towards the 
market has the potential to make the most efficient 
use of smallholders’ resources, assuming that they 
can specialise in production activities in which they 
have comparative advantage (von Braun and Kennedy 
1994). In practice, however, this argument needs 
considerable qualification. The major practical problem 
is that producers who specialise in production for 
market then have to depend on food markets for their 
own consumption needs. While food markets are high-
cost and/or volatile, few smallholders are willing to do 
this. Thus, especially in the early stages of the structural 
transformation, specialisation tends to be limited. 
Smallholders who do produce for market are often 
those with above-average land resources, who can, 
therefore, both produce a fair proportion of their own 
food needs and manage to produce crops for market 
(Heltberg 2001, cited in Leavy and Poulton 2007). This 
can be thought of as diversification beyond staple 
food production (Poulton and Ndufa 2005), rather than 
specialisation away from staple food production. If the 
degree of production specialisation is measured by 
a Herfindahl index of land areas or crop values, early 
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development of production for market may register as 
reduced, rather than increased, specialisation (Leavy 
and Poulton 2007). True specialisation generally awaits 
the later stages of the structural transformation (Pingali 
and Rosegrant 1995).
Thirdly, where production for market does increase the 
profits from farming, this permits a dynamic process 
of asset accumulation to occur. Two observations are 
important here:
•	 As noted previously, not all efforts at 
production for market are successful and lead 
to increased profits from farming. Furthermore, 
some apparently profitable activities turn 
out to be dependent on support received by 
smallholders from outside sources (e.g. a 
development project) and collapse once that 
support is withdrawn.
•	 Increased incomes from farming can be 
consumed, re-invested on farm or invested 
elsewhere. Where farms are small and non-
farm income sources limited, such that farm 
households are highly capital constrained, 
the marginal propensity to consume out 
of additional income may be expected to 
be high. This limits the extent of capital 
accumulation and hence commercialisation 
on the farms concerned, but, when multiplied 
across numerous poor households, the 
multiplier benefits for other parts of the 
economy can be significant. Other farm 
households may choose to invest much of 
their increased incomes in non-farm or general 
assets, including education. Thus, higher farm 
incomes may support diversification out of 
farming (‘stepping out’), as well as agricultural 
expansion (‘stepping up’).
Fourthly, commercialisation is often associated with 
increased productivity in agricultural production through 
increased use of capital inputs and/or good agricultural 
practices. This relationship requires brief discussion – 
not least so that APRA is consistent in its terminology in 
the coming years. Increasing reliance on the market for 
the acquisition of production inputs, including labour, is 
part of our definition of commercialisation. Does this, 
therefore, mean that intensification is a synonym for 
commercialisation? Agricultural development is replete 
with examples of projects that set out to promote 
uptake of various forms of productivity-enhancing 
purchased inputs. While some of these may have 
been transformative, many proved unsustainable, and 
uptake collapsed once the promotional efforts ended. 
A key lesson drawn from this experience is that efforts 
to promote new production practices generally need to 
be accompanied by measures to improve producers’ 
linkages to remunerative output markets, unless 
there is a means of subsidising the new practices 
over the medium-to-long term. Remunerative market 
opportunities provide both the incentives and at times 
the revenues for farmers to adopt new production 
practices. This suggests that we should emphasise 
increasing engagement with the market for the sale 
of produce as the leading element of our definition 
of commercialisation, with increasing reliance on 
the market for the acquisition of production inputs 
(including labour) providing complementary evidence 
of the deepening of the commercialisation process. 
Nevertheless, we should recognise that increased use 
of capital inputs – whether fertiliser for intensification or 
mechanisation for extensification – is one of the major 
channels through which commercialisation enhances 
livelihood outcomes for producers and potentially also 
their workers, as well as for the wider economy. We 
should also recognise that there will be exceptions 
to the rule that sustainable intensification is driven 
by increasing engagement with agricultural output 
markets – e.g. households that use non-farm earnings 
to intensify staple food production on small plots close 
to home while either food markets remain high-cost or 
volatile or their off-farm earnings appear insecure or 
unpredictable.
At the mesoeconomic (rural non-farm economy) and 
macroeconomic levels, there are important spillover 
effects from smallholder commercialisation, especially 
in the early stages of the structural transformation, 
when the agricultural sector is still fairly large relative to 
manufacturing and services. These spillover effects were 
listed briefly in section 1. Many of them also flow from 
large farm growth. However, relatively poor smallholder 
households may devote a large portion of incremental 
income to the purchase of non-tradable goods and 
services (Delgado et al. 1998), thereby generating 
larger consumption and production multipliers than 
large-scale farms (Bautista and Thomas 1999), where a 
greater share of incremental income is ultimately spent 
on imported capital inputs and consumer goods. 
Smallholder commercialisation can expand demand for 
manufactured goods and services produced in major 
urban centres (Mellor 1986), but is also the major driver 
of growth of the rural non-farm economy (Haggblade et 
al. 2007). In areas where smallholder commercialisation 
is fairly broad-based (e.g. export cash crop-producing 
zones with moderate-to-low population density), rapid 
expansion of ‘rural towns’ can be observed in periods of 
sustained high prices or productivity increase (Jedwab 
2013). This occurs both because farm households 
demand greater quantities of production inputs and 
consumption goods and because some of the profits 
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from crop sales are invested in real estate in nearby 
urban centres.
De Janvry and Sadoulet (2002) argued that the nature 
of local food products – tradable vs non-tradable 
– has a major influence on the spillover effects that 
are realised from agricultural (including smallholder) 
commercialisation. Where major food crops are tradable 
(e.g. rice), increased productivity and marketed volumes 
have limited impact on the consumer price, which is 
largely determined by international markets.9 Thus, 
the majority of the benefits from commercialisation 
remain in rural areas. By contrast, where major food 
crops are non-tradable (e.g. cassava, yams, white 
maize), increased productivity and marketed volumes 
put downward pressure on prices, thereby passing a 
share of the benefits onto consumers. This in turn may 
assist in keeping urban wages low, which is good for 
growth in tradable manufacturing and service sectors. 
However, farmers will only end up better off if their 
rate of productivity growth exceeds the rate of decline 
in output prices. As several major African food crops 
are non-tradable and demand is inelastic with respect 
to price, demand constraints are a non-trivial issue 
for smallholder commercialisation in Africa, ongoing 
urbanisation and growth in incomes notwithstanding 
(Diao et al. 2003).
More recently, Gollin et al. (2013) and Jedwab (2013) 
have highlighted the phenomenon of ‘consumption 
cities’ in Africa. They argue that natural resource 
exploitation, including agricultural exports, has provided 
a major stimulus to urban growth by increasing demand 
for goods and services that are typically produced in 
urban areas. However, natural resource revenues may 
also discourage production of tradable manufacturing 
and services products through Dutch disease effects. 
Thus, economic activity in the urban areas that have 
grown in response to natural resource exploitation has 
tended to be dominated by production of non-tradable 
services. Meanwhile, tradable manufacturing and 
services products are imported to meet growing local 
demand. Thus, while urbanisation rates are similar in 
Africa and Asia, the share of the labour force employed 
in manufacturing, in particular, is much higher in Asia. 
As tradable manufacturing and services products are 
subject to international competition, whereas non-
tradable services are not, productivity growth tends 
to be higher in the former. So-called ‘consumption 
cities’ are, therefore, likely to be associated with slower 
economic growth in the medium-to-long term than 
‘production cities’ that produce tradable manufacturing 
and services products (Gollin et al. 2013).
The analysis of Jedwab (2013) focuses on the impacts 
of cocoa expansion in Ghana and Côte d’Ivoire. 
Jedwab portrays cocoa production as generating 
(once-off) high rents from the exploitation of primary 
forest and as having involved relatively little productivity 
enhancement (beyond the release of new tree varieties) 
during the past century of cultivation. By contrast, 
commercialisation of the production of (internationally) 
non-tradable food crops or of lower-value tradable 
crops – which would require considerable investment 
in productivity enhancement along the value chain to 
be competitive internationally – could be expected to 
make qualitatively different contributions to the process 
of structural transformation.
Gollin et al. (2013) and Jedwab (2013) analyse historic 
data and find consistent patterns. However, just as the 
problem of Dutch disease has been managed better by 
some countries than others, this does not mean that 
natural resource exploitation must lead to the rise of 
consumption cities. Whitfield (2011) and Whitfield et al. 
(2015) argue that failures of industrial policy explain why 
Ghana has not developed a stronger manufacturing 
sector and seek explanations for these failures in the 
nature of the Ghanaian political settlement.
Literature on the later stages of the structural 
transformation has tended to focus on the impact 
that changes in urban areas have on the structure and 
market orientation of agricultural production, rather than 
on the contribution of agricultural commercialisation 
to structural transformation. However, work in Latin 
America and elsewhere indicates that, in middle-income 
country contexts, the small size of the agricultural sector 
relative to gross domestic product (GDP) understates its 
importance to overall growth due to its forward linkages 
to both agro-processing industries (as a source of raw 
materials) and food retail (World Bank Group 2015; 
Valdés and Foster 2010).
3.5  Losers from smallholder    
 commercialisation
During the early stages of the structural transformation, 
the systemic changes associated with smallholder 
commercialisation are modest. Households in favoured 
areas and/or with above-average resource endowments 
may seek to respond to growing market demand for 
agricultural products, but the majority of smallholder 
households maintain a pattern of semi-subsistence 
production that evolves only slowly. 
At household level, therefore, those at greatest risk of 
incurring losses due to agricultural commercialisation 
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are the very households who experiment with greater 
production for market. Experimentation with new 
techniques or ventures into new crops or markets may 
ultimately prove unsuccessful. Investment in production 
intensification or extensification may not generate the 
hoped-for financial returns, perhaps due to adverse 
weather events or shifts in market prices. If too many 
farmers invest in response to the same perceived 
market opportunity, yet demand is inelastic, increased 
supply can cause prices to crash, leaving many of 
these farmers worse off (Diao et al. 2003), though 
consumers experience a corresponding gain. Farmers 
are particularly vulnerable to price or other changes 
when they are somehow ‘locked in’ to production of a 
particular crop. Planting tree crops with long gestation 
periods provides one example of this (Baumann 2000). 
In the case of tree crops, households also have to wait 
several years for commercialisation benefits to come on 
stream, even though they have to divert land and labour 
to the new venture from the outset (Bellin 1994). 
These risks are believed to be an important factor 
discouraging many resource-poor smallholder 
households from increasing their exposure to agricultural 
output markets. On the other hand, it is often the early 
innovators in new crops and markets who achieve the 
greatest gains, as they commence production before a 
wider supply response has bid prices down.
Von Braun and Kennedy’s (1994) seminal work 
examined the intra-household impacts of early 
stage smallholder commercialisation. This series 
of 11 studies in 10 countries investigated whether 
smallholder commercialisation might benefit male 
household members – typically household heads – but 
at the expense of female members (through increased, 
but unremunerated, labour demands) and thereby 
also children (through reduced care time or poorer 
nutrition, as mothers’ cropping activities for household 
consumption suffered due to extra workloads producing 
crops for market). In these 11 studies (in Gambia, 
Guatemala, India, Kenya, Malawi, Papua New Guinea, 
the Philippines, Rwanda, Sierra Leone and Zambia):
•	 The most common finding was that, with the 
introduction or expansion of some production 
activities for market, male labour increased 
relative to female labour across the totality of 
household agricultural activities.
•	 However, decision-making in the commercial 
activities was also dominated by men, 
and they typically controlled the resulting 
revenues.
•	 In five cases, participation in a 
commercialisation initiative was associated 
with households increasing their total 
expenditure on food; in three cases, it was not. 
In all cases where food expenditure increased, 
this was partially due to increased expenditure 
on more expensive foods, such as meat and 
fruits.
•	 In eight cases, calorie consumption by 
participating households increased; in one 
case, it did not. More diverse diets (as above) 
were expected to have additional nutritional 
benefits.
•	 Participation in cash cropping (even non-
food cash crops) had no negative effects on 
household nutrition or health, as measured 
primarily by pre-schooler weight-for-height 
scores, morbidity rates and sickness profiles. 
However, the observed positive effects were 
small.
These findings are consistent with bargaining models 
of smallholder household decision-making, in which 
female members can negotiate changes to household 
practices to compensate for any adverse effects from 
new, market-oriented activities controlled by men. 
However, unequal bargaining power within such 
negotiations – as, for example, would be consistent with 
the woman maintaining a basic ‘reservation position’ 
during the negotiations – will also result in unequal 
sharing of the benefits from commercialisation. This is a 
topic that will be central to the APRA studies. 
In the later stages of the structural transformation, 
smallholder commercialisation is associated with 
profound changes in landholding patterns and market 
orientation of production. However, the main factor 
that limits the number of losers from smallholder 
commercialisation at this stage is the same factor that 
drives it: demand for labour from outside the agricultural 
sector, principally from the manufacturing and service 
sectors. The main losers at this stage, therefore, are 
those individuals or households who neither make 
the transition to non-farm employment nor manage 
to ‘step up’ their agricultural production activities 
through consolidation of landholdings, progressive 
mechanisation of production and engagement with 
remunerative market opportunities. They are likely to 
end up as landless rural households, dependent for 
their livelihood on employment on other people’s farms.
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The second type of agricultural commercialisation 
occurs when smallholder farm households are 
complemented or replaced by medium- or large-scale 
farm enterprises. This section examines large-scale 
farms, leaving consideration of medium-scale farms to 
the next section.10 
As large-scale agricultural enterprises rely almost 
entirely on the market for the sale of produce and for 
the acquisition of production inputs, including labour, 
their insertion into the agricultural landscape represents 
(a degree of) commercialisation at agricultural sector 
level, even if they coexist with large numbers of semi-
subsistence smallholder households. Their presence 
and activity in both input and output markets may also 
have spillover effects that encourage commercialisation 
among nearby smallholder households (see below).
We distinguish two main types of large-scale farms:
 
•	 large-scale family farms, which are managed 
by members of the family who own or rent 
the farm, with family labour complemented by 
mechanisation and hired labour
•	 estates or plantations, which are managed 
by professional persons employed or 
contracted in by the owners (who could be 
private individuals or a company). Estates 
and plantations are often associated with 
investment in a processing facility, with the 
farm operation supplying raw materials for 
the processing facility as part of a vertically 
coordinated operation.
In both cases (but more commonly in the latter case), the 
large-scale farm also buys produce from surrounding 
smallholders for processing at its facility or for sale 
through its marketing channels. As an interlocked part 
of these arrangements, it may also provide technical 
advice and/or seasonal credit to these ‘outgrowers’ 
in an effort to raise the quantity and/or quality of their 
production.
Large-scale farms and their associated processing 
operations often also create employment for members 
of smallholder households in surrounding areas.
4.1  Why do large farms exist?
At the end of the structural transformation, large-scale 
farms emerge as the result of the operation of market 
forces, assuming that countervailing political forces do 
not arise to provide protection to small-scale farms. 
As urban demand for labour pulls labour out of rural 
areas by offering higher wages in urban employment, 
this exerts two pressures on farms. Firstly, declining 
labour availability means that available land can only be 
farmed if capital is substituted for labour (i.e. through 
mechanisation). Secondly, farms can only achieve 
returns to labour (and hence pay wages) remotely 
comparable to those obtainable in urban areas if they 
complement labour with capital so as to cultivate greater 
areas of land per worker (again, achieved through 
mechanisation). This process of agrarian structural 
change is likely to produce primarily large-scale family 
farms, although some estate farms may also be created 
as the land market becomes increasingly active.
By contrast, these market pressures are not observed 
during the early stages of the structural transformation, 
when rural labour is plentiful and low-cost, but 
capital is expensive.11 In these conditions, the relative 
competitiveness and efficiency of large-scale vs 
smallholder farms are hotly debated (Collier and Dercon 
2009; Wiggins 2009). The high yields and quality of 
large-scale farms – visible and impressive – are also 
often achieved at high cost. Relative to smallholders, 
large-scale farms economise on what is often the most 
abundant factor of production (labour) while making 
more intensive use of scarce factors such as capital 
and land. 
Poulton et al. (2010) observe that large-scale farms 
enjoy competitive advantages over smallholders in 
many areas (e.g. input, output and financial markets, 
information, quality assurance and traceability), but are 
disadvantaged when it comes to labour costs. Three 
main arguments are advanced for why smallholders 
enjoy a labour cost advantage.
The first argument is that, because they share in the 
profits or losses of smallholder household production, 
family members are more motivated to perform 
LARGE-SCALE COMMERCIAL 
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tasks diligently than are hired labourers on large-
scale farms. This economises on labour monitoring, 
which is particularly important and challenging where 
the landscape comprises several micro-ecosystems 
(Binswanger and Rosenzweig 1986). 
A possible counter-observation to this is that large-scale 
farms have been observed to perform well in various 
horticulture and floriculture activities (Maertens and 
Swinnen 2009; Tyler 2007a; Dolan et al. 1999), even 
though these activities are usually labour-intensive. One 
explanation is that quality standards in export markets 
demand traceability, which large-scale farms are much 
better placed to deliver than smallholders (Maertens 
and Swinnen 2009; Poulton et al. 2010). However, as 
noted earlier, horticulture and floriculture are less land-
intensive and more capital-intensive than many other 
crops, and cultivation often takes place under more 
controlled conditions (irrigation, tunnelling), such that 
tasks are more uniform, although still requiring care.
Deininger and Byerlee (2012) raise the possibility that 
technological advances – such as pesticide- and 
herbicide-tolerant seed varieties, zero tillage practices 
and machinery operations guided by Global Positioning 
System (GPS) technology – may reduce the burden 
of labour supervision for field crops, hence reducing 
the competitive advantages of smallholder cultivation. 
These advances have so far made limited impact on 
African agriculture, although this could change in due 
course.
The second argument is that, because their labour 
resources are under-utilised due to small plots and 
limited demand from other parts of the economy, 
smallholder family members tend to ‘self-exploit’ – 
providing labour beyond the point at which marginal 
revenue equals marginal cost. This will remain a 
powerful argument until urban demand pulls labour out 
of rural areas.
The third argument is that, even when they hire 
workers, smallholders often do so at lower cost than 
large-scale farms. They may hire people they know and 
trust from within their community and may also work 
alongside them in the (small) field, if hired labour is used 
to supplement family labour for particular tasks. Thus, 
monitoring is accomplished at minimal cost. They may 
also pay less than large-scale farms, who are subject to 
minimum wage legislation and may be bound (by law or 
brand reputation) to provide additional benefits beyond 
the wage. Note, however, that these latter arguments 
imply that employment on large-scale farms should 
generate greater benefits for the individuals concerned 
than employment on the farms of other smallholders. 
Binswanger and Rosenzweig (1986) argue that the 
labour cost advantages of smallholders normally 
outweigh the competitive advantages of large-scale 
farms in low-wage economies – i.e. in the early stages 
of the structural transformation. The major exception 
they identify is when there are significant coordination 
costs associated with supplying large quantities of 
highly perishable materials to an expensive processing 
plant. Organising large numbers of smallholders to 
deliver a continuous flow of crops may be prohibitively 
expensive, resulting in times when either the plant 
operates at well below capacity or excess supplies 
are spoilt because they cannot be processed in time. 
Coordinating production within a single estate farm is 
then more efficient.
Reviewing experience with commercial production 
of a range of crops across Africa, Poulton et al. 
(2008) find that large-scale farms have, on balance, 
outperformed smallholders in a number of crops, 
including export horticulture, sugar (due to the 
demanding land preparation requirements for high-
yielding production12) and flue-cured tobacco (where 
coordination is important). In tea, both smallholders 
and large-scale farms have proven competitive. Here, 
the labour-intensity and care required in the picking 
process favours smallholder production, while high 
perishability favours large-scale production. Meanwhile, 
smallholders dominate food crop production, cotton 
(labour intensive over a long season) and cashew – 
none of which are perishable products. Outside of 
former settler economies (see below), attempts to 
produce maize and cotton on large-scale farms in 
Africa have generally proven unsustainable.13 Even in 
Zimbabwe, the extension of support services for cotton 
production to smallholder producers in the 1980s and 
1990s fairly rapidly drove large-scale farmers out of the 
sector, the exception being a small number of farms 
that continued to produce certified seed for the rest 
of the industry. However, large-scale farms had other 
options – including in export horticulture and flue-cured 
tobacco, where smallholders could not compete. The 
basic message from this review was that smallholders 
remain competitive with (or still outcompete) large-scale 
farms in many of the most important crops grown in 
Africa.14 However, following similar logic to that of 
Binswanger and Rosenzweig (1986), there are some 
crops in which large-scale farms enjoy a competitive 
advantage.
A similar message emerges from the review by Baglioni 
and Gibbon (2013). They estimate that the share of land 
under large-scale cultivation in Africa remained at a fairly 
constant 5–7.5 percent from the first decade of the 
twentieth century to the first decade of the twenty-first 
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– i.e. before the recent large-scale land rush. However, 
they also observe that the range of crops grown by 
large-scale farms narrowed – with horticulture coming 
to occupy an increasingly prominent place in terms of 
total investment, if not land area – as smallholders came 
to dominate crops that had been the preserve of settler 
farms prior to independence.15
A further argument for the enduring competitive 
advantage of labour-intensive (hence smallholder) 
production in Africa is the very limited progress with 
mechanisation – despite numerous government and 
donor efforts to promote it over the years. Expensive 
tractors, spare parts and fuel rarely compete on cost 
with abundant labour, augmented in areas of lower 
population density by animal traction. 
The recent development of commercial tractor hire 
services in Ghana, analysed by Diao et al. (2014), is 
a significant exception to this statement, but may still 
be ‘the exception that proves the rule’. Ghana has 
enjoyed 30 years of sustained economic growth and 
considerable reduction in extreme poverty. Moreover, 
it has one of the highest urbanisation rates in Africa, 
such that rural labour is no longer plentiful (Nin-Pratt 
and McBride 2014; Jedwab 2013). By contrast, 
land is available in some parts of the country and the 
number of medium-scale farms (10–100 hectares) has 
increased by 360 percent between 1992 and 2012 to 
over 200,000. By 2005, farms of this size accounted 
for over 30 percent of cultivated land in Ghana, while 
farms of 5 hectares or less accounted for less than 
50 percent (Jayne et al. 2016). In this context, private 
tractor operators have developed commercially viable 
hire services by importing second-hand tractors 
(makes for which spare parts can be reliably obtained 
or produced within Ghana), exploiting the different 
production seasons in the south-centre and north of 
the country (thereby generating returns on the principal 
capital asset for more than six months of the year) and 
serving interested smallholders primarily as an add-on 
to the main client base of medium-scale farms (Diao et 
al. 2014). 
The facilitating conditions in Ghana are at best only 
partially replicated in most other African countries. 
Private tractor hire services do exist in some parts of 
many countries. However, more rigorous research is 
required to determine whether these are fully sustainable 
commercially, including covering the replacement cost 
of the tractor over its working lifecycle, or whether 
they are based on privileged access to subsidised 
tractors imported through government mechanisation 
schemes that are not replaced once they reach the 
end of their working life. Either way, however, the 
Ghana example does illustrate the changing nature of 
African economies, hence the likelihood that increased 
agricultural commercialisation will be observed in more 
countries in the not-too-distant future.
Thus far, this section has argued that the establishment 
of large-scale farms is only justified on efficiency 
and competitiveness grounds in low-income (hence 
low-wage) economies under fairly tightly prescribed 
conditions related to the characteristics of particular 
crops. Why, then, do more large farms exist than is 
justified by these criteria? The basic answer is that 
powerful people use their power to acquire rights to 
land in the expectation that this will provide them with a 
source of rents (see Khan 2005; 1995).
This explains the establishment of colonial settler 
farms in southern and eastern Africa (Deininger and 
Binswanger 1995). Many of these were family farms. 
On the basis of their ethnicity, the settler families were 
often given access to the highest potential land – once 
existing owners and occupants had been forcibly 
removed. Where smallholder farmers were displaced to 
lower potential, sometimes semi-arid land (as in South 
Africa and Zimbabwe) that was also further from major 
market centres and under-served by infrastructure and 
support services, it is not surprising that large-scale 
farms could then outcompete smallholders. 
The recent scramble for land in Africa (Schoneveld 
2014; Deininger and Byerlee 2012) exhibits both 
similarities and differences to the colonial experience. 
There may have been fewer forcible removals of 
existing owners and occupants, but often there has 
been limited consultation, disregard of use rights other 
than direct cultivation, and inadequate compensation 
(Rahmato 2011; Vermeulen and Cotula 2010). Instead 
of generating family farms (with the exception of some 
South African farmers who have resettled in other 
African countries), this wave of land acquisitions has 
primarily created estates. The role of domestic investors 
in large-scale land acquisition is also now gaining 
increasing attention (Cotula et al. 2014).
In the process of land (re-)allocation, rents may accrue to 
politicians, bureaucrats and local leaders who facilitate 
the deals (Alden Wily 2011) and also often directly to the 
state, where it expropriates the land from its traditional 
custodians to lease it to investors (Wolford et al. 2013; 
Rahmato 2011). The rent streams to the new operators 
remain to be seen. Where prime land has been acquired 
and/or land is cultivated to crops, such as sugar, for 
which large-scale farms have an observed competitive 
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advantage, the acquisition of land use rights – often 
at very low rental values – should generate a strong 
profit stream. However, the argument of this section so 
far is that large-scale farms often do not outcompete 
smallholders in Africa. Moreover, mechanisation is rarely 
a cost-efficient way of cultivating land. Thus, we should 
expect many of the recent land allocations to remain 
undeveloped or under-developed, with only a fraction 
of the granted land area actually cultivated (see www.
landmatrix.org for current evidence on this). Much of 
the cultivation that does occur may use quite labour-
intensive methods. 
If the rent streams to the new operators are uncertain, 
one explanation for the extent of recent land acquisition 
activity is that much of it has apparently been quite 
speculative. This was most notably the case for 
jatropha, for which viable commercial cultivation 
practices had not even been demonstrated, and other 
biofuel crops (Schoneveld 2014). Some speculators 
will succeed in selling on the land rights that they have 
acquired and make a profit; others may not. Meanwhile, 
there is evidence in some countries that many land 
transactions – albeit rarely the largest – have involved 
domestic investors (see Ali et al. 2015; Cotula et al. 
2014; Rahmato 2011 for the case of Ethiopia). The 
balance of productive and speculative (or opportunistic) 
intentions in these deals remains to be seen.
4.2  Benefits of ‘early’     
 establishment of large farms
Consistent with its usage in the rest of the paper, the 
term ‘early’ in the title of this section and the next refers 
to the stage of the structural transformation. However, 
one way of summarising the arguments of these two 
sections is that the establishment of large-scale farms 
at this time may also be ‘premature’ in relation to what 
is going on elsewhere in the economy. These farms 
may be intended to ‘kick-start’ developments beyond 
their boundaries, but they can also have a series of 
unintended and deleterious consequences that are at 
least as important.
Promoters of large-scale farms argue that they can 
generate foreign exchange or food supplies to growing 
urban populations, along with employment generation. 
The previous section argued that large-scale farms 
have competitive advantages over smallholders in the 
production of some crops, which may increase foreign 
exchange revenues (e.g. horticulture, sugar, flue-cured 
tobacco). However, they are rarely the optimal way 
to increase the supply of staple foods to feed urban 
populations. 
Successful large-scale farms may also generate some 
higher-quality work opportunities (greater security, 
better terms) than smallholder commercialisation. 
However, because large-scale farms face higher 
employment costs than smallholders, they will usually 
generate less employment per ton of output produced 
than smallholders would. Whether they generate more 
or less employment per hectare of land cultivated 
depends both on the capital-intensity of the large-scale 
production process and whether this capital is labour-
saving (e.g. tractors for cereal production) or not (e.g. 
greenhouses or drip irrigation in horticulture). In Ethiopia, 
Ali et al. (2015) find very little permanent employment 
per hectare cultivated on large-scale farms. Nolte et 
al. (2016) also report strikingly low employment per 
thousand hectares ‘in operation’ across a sample of 
127 projects in the Land Matrix database – figures that 
presumably must rise somewhat over time. Cotula et al. 
(2014) note that agricultural labour demand is inherently 
seasonal, so the number of permanent jobs created – 
where greater security and better terms are more likely 
to be observed – is likely to be low.16
One condition under which large-scale farms may 
generate more employment than comparable 
smallholder commercialisation efforts is if they are able 
to expand production well in excess of what is possible 
for smallholders. Maertens and Swinnen (2009) illustrate 
this effect for horticulture in Senegal, where large-scale 
farms proved to be more able than smallholders to 
compete in export markets that impose traceability 
requirements. Production of many horticultural crops is 
also inherently quite labour-intensive. The net result was 
more employment generated via a large-scale farm route 
than was possible via smallholder commercialisation.17 
Van den Broeck et al. (2017) reinforce these earlier 
findings using panel data and show that, unlike most 
other forms of non-farm employment in the Senegal 
River Delta, employment on large-scale horticultural 
farms and their associated processing facilities 
disproportionately benefited poorer households; and 
80 percent of those employed in this way are women.
Cotula (2013) argues that those who gain employment 
in new, large-scale enterprises – commonly including 
youth and/or migrant labourers – are often poorer 
than those whose livelihoods were disrupted by the 
investment (see next section). Unfortunately, there are 
many reports of disgruntled communities who argue 
that they were promised employment opportunities 
when investors were seeking their blessing for a project 
on their land, yet once the project was approved the 
promises went unfulfilled.
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Another reason for policy-makers to encourage the 
establishment of large-scale farms during the early 
stages of the structural transformation is that less state 
facilitation and support is required for large-scale farms 
to operate than is required to promote smallholder 
commercialisation and productivity enhancement 
(Deininger and Byerlee 2012; Poulton et al. 2010). This 
is analogous to one of the main arguments for leveraging 
private capital for investment in public goods through 
certain public–private partnership schemes (Hodge 
and Greve 2009): draw on private resources where 
the state cannot deliver quickly enough. Establishing 
land rights can be a time-consuming business before 
a project commences. However, once up and running, 
large-scale farms can be expected to source their 
own capital, production inputs, technical and market 
information – services that need to be brought close to 
the farm gate, ideally with some degree of coordination, 
if large numbers of smallholders are to increase their 
production for market (Poulton et al. 2010). Few African 
state agencies have yet developed the capacity to 
coordinate the supply of services from diverse private 
providers or to effectively supply services to fill gaps left 
by private provision (e.g. extension). Political leaders 
who want to show some progress in the agricultural 
sector, but know that the state agencies at their 
disposal do not have the capacity to deliver much – and 
do not have the time for systemic reforms before the 
next election – may well find the prospect of large-scale 
farms attractive.
Similarly, for obvious reasons of land availability, large-
scale farms are most likely to be established in areas 
of low population density.18 (Subsequently, population 
density may increase around successful farms.) 
Settling such areas for smallholder cultivation will 
require considerable investment in basic infrastructure. 
By contrast, some (very) large farm investments may 
include an element of basic infrastructure provision, 
such as feeder roads (Deininger and Byerlee 2012), 
which will ultimately benefit other settlers in the area. 
Conversely, however, some investors negotiate 
infrastructure requirements with state agencies (central 
or local) as a prerequisite for starting a project.
Once operational, large-scale farms may also generate 
spillover benefits for nearby smallholder farms. Ali et al. 
(2016) explore this question for Ethiopia by combining 
panel survey and geographic information system data. 
In this study, large farms are defined as those cultivating 
50 hectares or more. Ali et al. (2016) find that, other 
things being equal:
•	 The closer a smallholder farm is to a large-
scale farm, the more likely it is to apply 
fertiliser to its maize crop. These effects are 
particularly pronounced where the large-scale 
farm is within 25km of the smallholder farm 
and where it also produces maize. However, 
no comparable effects were observed for 
sorghum, teff or wheat cultivation.
•	 Proximity to a large-scale farm also has 
a modest influence on the likelihood that 
smallholders will use improved seed in maize 
and teff production. 
•	 The closer a smallholder farm is to a large-
scale farm (especially one that produces 
maize) the higher the observed maize yield on 
the smallholder farm. However, no comparable 
effects were observed for teff (where 
smallholder yields were 50 percent higher 
than those on commercial farms) or sorghum 
cultivation.
•	 Proximity to a large-scale farm had no impact 
whatsoever on the likelihood that smallholder 
household members would hire their labour 
out for off-farm work. Ali et al. (2016) comment 
that more work is needed on this, but this 
initial result suggests that most large farms 
in Ethiopia create little employment for local 
residents.
The precise mechanisms through which these spillover 
effects operate are yet to be determined. However, the 
first two effects suggest that the presence of a large-
scale farm may stimulate the development of local input 
supply systems. The yield effect could indicate that 
there is also some knowledge transfer or demonstration 
effect, although how this would work without many 
local residents being employed on the large-scale 
farms is unclear. Ali et al. (2016) observe that the 
productivity spillovers are not of the order of magnitude 
where they might be considered as a substitute for 
more conventional extension support to smallholder 
producers. Other spillover effects (e.g. greater presence 
of output buyers raising prices for local smallholders) 
are also possible.
4.3  Losers from early     
 establishment of large farms
Losses from the establishment of large-scale farms 
centre on the issue of land access. Even in areas of 
low population density, land is rarely unused (Alden 
Wily 2011; Future Agricultures Consortium 2010). 
Therefore, the establishment of large-scale farms 
generally involves the curtailment of existing use rights 
to the land in question. Although the majority of land 
in Africa falls under customary tenure regimes, these 
are rarely accorded the same legal status as titled lands 
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(freehold, leasehold), which facilitates dispossession 
(Alden Wily 2011). Whenever existing use rights are 
under-compensated (in terms of alternative land and/
or financial payment) and the new project is unable to 
generate sufficient secure and remunerative employment 
to replace the incomes previously generated from the 
land,19 those whose pre-existing land rights have been 
curtailed lose out. Sadly, this is all too common. The 
reasons for it include the following: 
•	 Especially in areas of low-to-medium 
population density, land use is rarely confined 
to crop cultivation, with other uses including 
grazing, and harvesting of firewood, wild 
foods and medicines. Careful surveys have 
documented the variety of these uses, their 
contribution to livelihoods and their particular 
importance to the poorest households (Beck 
and Nesmith 2001; Cavendish 1999; Jodha 
1995). However, they are not easy to quantify 
through casual investigation, as many uses are 
seasonal and some are relied on primarily in 
years of poor rainfall. Thus, many are likely to 
be unobserved and under-valued if and when 
officials visit a site as part of the approval 
process for a new investment. Furthermore, 
such uses are inadequately recognised in 
compensation legislation in some countries 
(Cotula 2013).
•	 As well as income flows, existing land 
uses commonly provide social protection, 
nutrition, health and identity benefits, although 
these are hard to quantify. Neither financial 
compensation nor employment directly 
replaces all these aspects and it is unrealistic 
to expect that missing benefits will either 
be provided by the state or can be readily 
purchased from ‘the market’ in the areas in 
question.
•	 Many formal processes for assessing 
compensation are cursory (Vermeulen and 
Cotula 2010), driven by an imperative to 
facilitate investment, in a context in which the 
law may offer limited protection to those being 
displaced, while those with power are as 
likely to be allied with the investor as with the 
current users of the land. Reviewing available 
evidence from 180 land deals listed in the 
Land Matrix database,20 Nolte et al. (2016) find 
that only 14 percent conducted consultation 
with local communities that amounted to 
obtaining ‘free, prior and informed consent’. 
In many cases, communities have expressed 
their rejection of projects in one way or 
another, but those projects have been 
approved regardless.
•	 In the process of facilitating investment, land 
use rights do not simply pass from existing 
users to the investor, but are first appropriated 
by the state, to then be allocated to the 
investor, often by way of a lease (Rahmato 
2011). When projects fail, are delayed or do 
not deliver the benefits promised to local 
inhabitants, leases may not be revoked and, 
even if they are, the land is often not returned 
to the original users (Nolte 2014; Cotula 2013).
 
These immediate impacts are now widely documented. 
Cotula (2013) argues that, to date in Africa, ‘the 
negatives tend to outweigh the positives… As a broad 
generalisation, local livelihoods tend to be disrupted 
in ways that are not offset by the new agricultural 
venture’ (Cotula 2013: 139, 145). Reporting on a 
systematic scoping study of 170 studies, published 
between 2005 and 2013, claiming to report on impacts 
of large-scale land acquisitions in sub-Saharan Africa, 
Oya (2013) found that 60 percent ‘reported negative 
outcomes as their dominant conclusion… while fewer 
than 3 percent reported mainly positive outcomes’ 
(Ibid.: 1545). However, he observed that this need not 
be an unbiased reflection of reality. Some studies may 
have been purposively undertaken to demonstrate the 
negative impacts of large-scale land acquisitions. In 
other cases, it is possible that the short-term impacts 
were predominantly negative (e.g. displacement, 
under-compensation), but that positive impacts (e.g. 
employment, market linkages) would take longer to be 
realised – i.e. after the initial studies were completed. 
This is a point also recognised by Cotula (2013). Oya 
(2013) also observed that none of the studies contained 
a proper baseline assessment, documenting the often 
difficult and vulnerable rural livelihoods that preceded 
the investments.
Of equal concern are the longer-term implications of 
creating dualistic agricultural sectors. History teaches 
us that inequality tends to perpetuate itself (Acemoglu 
and Robinson 2013; North et al. 2009; de Ferranti et al. 
2004). Large-scale farms can exert influence over both 
national and local decision-makers that unorganised 
smallholders are unable to match. This can reduce 
taxation revenues from large-scale enterprises and, 
from those reduced revenues, reduce the share that is 
spent on public goods provision (which would benefit 
smallholders) as opposed to transfers (which are more 
readily captured by powerful elites) (Lopez 2004). 
Where large-scale farms are successfully established, 
they can enter into a symbiotic relationship with formal 
food retail systems and/or with processes of urban 
development more generally. In the former case, formal 
food retail systems develop on the basis of systems 
that work with large-scale suppliers and the low 
transaction costs that such relationships entail. There 
is an apparent correlation between African countries 
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that have first engaged with the retail revolution 
(Weatherspoon and Reardon 2003) and those with 
dualistic agricultural sectors (Poulton et al. 2010). Retail 
development is often good news for urban consumers, 
but these relationships can foreclose possibilities 
for later smallholder commercialisation. Transaction 
costs prevail over production costs in supply chain 
relationships. In the latter case, those displaced from 
their land by large-scale agricultural development may 
become cheap labour for manufacturing or mining, as 
in South Africa, ensuring that inequality is an economy-
wide phenomenon.
These arguments arise from the experience of countries 
where large-scale farms were established on some of 
the highest potential land, so could then compete with 
smallholders – possibly also with additional support 
from a colonial state. The dynamics that reproduce 
inequality over time and across the economy may be 
weaker where large-scale farms are established in 
the midst of a competitive smallholder sector. Yet, the 
lobbying power of large farm interests should not be 
underestimated (see also comments below on medium-
scale farms). This is an important subject for research. 
The danger is that dualistic agricultural sectors lay 
the foundations of inequality for generations, even 
centuries to come – potentially long after the problem of 
extreme monetary poverty, as measured by the current 
international poverty line, has been eradicated.
4.4  A note on contract farming and  
 outgrower schemes
Contract farming is a system whereby a buyer of an 
agricultural commodity – usually a processor or exporter 
– supports smallholder suppliers to increase the quantity 
and/or quality of their output through provision of pre-
harvest services, typically input supply on credit and 
extension advice. The input credit is recovered through 
deductions made at the time of purchase and the 
increased throughput in the processing facility or export 
contracts justifies the cost of extension provision and 
the risk entailed in credit supply. The ability to recover 
loans is central to successful contract farming (Poulton 
et al. 1998). Thus, there have to be mechanisms to 
minimise side-buying and side-selling of the contracted 
crops. Outgrower schemes are essentially contract 
farming where the processor also operates its own core 
estate. The ‘outgrowers’, i.e. contracted smallholders, 
then supply a proportion of the throughput to the 
processing facility, complementing the output produced 
on the core estate.
Contract farming is a popular means of promoting 
smallholder commercialisation (see section 3), albeit 
one that works better for some crops than others (Oya 
2012; Poulton et al. 2010). It is easier to enforce contract 
repayment where there are few buyers of the crop. This 
could be an outcome of market regulation, as is often 
the case in cotton (Tschirley et al. 2009; Poulton et al. 
2004), or a by-product of high post-harvest perishability 
(Binswanger and Rosenzweig 1986). Buyers of crops 
that are not (widely) consumed by the communities that 
produce them are less likely to suffer competition from 
local, informal marketing channels. However, the same 
market power that enables buyers to enforce credit 
contracts can also be used to depress the terms of 
the contracts that are offered to smallholders – mostly 
obviously, lowering the prices for output or raising 
the price charged for inputs, but also changing the 
criteria used to accept or reject produce for processing 
(Henson et al. 2005). The dynamic of ‘agribusiness 
normalisation’ (Kusterer 1982) – whereby a processor 
offers attractive terms to smallholders to encourage 
them to enter into contract farming relationships, so as 
to increase throughput to its processing facility, then 
gradually depresses those terms over time once the 
desired level of capacity utilisation is achieved – has 
long been recognised in the contract farming literature.
In recent years, initiatives such as the New Alliance 
for Food Security and Nutrition have argued that 
contract farming and outgrower schemes are 
useful mechanisms to incorporate smallholders into 
agricultural commercialisation processes. The emphasis 
on outgrower schemes is particularly noteworthy, as 
these provide a means of incorporating smallholders 
into commercialisation processes in which large-scale 
farms are central. The critical question then is whether 
smallholder commercialisation is a central objective 
of such programmes or in some sense ‘window 
dressing’. A related question from the perspective 
of the processors, which is likely to be critical to the 
smallholder commercialisation outcomes, is as follows: 
what is the real justification for inclusion of outgrowers? 
Are they expected to enhance the efficiency of the 
entire processing operation (due to their labour cost 
advantages discussed earlier)? Do they enable the 
operation to expand beyond what it would otherwise 
be capable of, by making more land available for 
production of the crop in question? Or does their 
inclusion in the operation increase the political backing 
that it is likely to receive (for initial approval and during 
subsequent lobbying)? 
The critical indicator of this is the size of the core 
estate relative to the scale of the processing operation. 
If a processor can (almost) achieve its break-even 
processing capacity utilisation from its core estate 
alone, then its incentive to invest in the productivity 
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and upskilling of smallholder outgrowers is greatly 
diminished. By contrast, if the core estate provides a 
means of stabilising the raw material supply over an 
extended season (for example, through use of irrigation 
technology that is not available to many outgrowers) 
and/or a place to experiment with innovative production 
techniques, but outgrowers provide the majority of the 
supply to the processing facility, then the processor 
will be more strongly incentivised to invest in their 
capabilities. Note that this still does not remove the 
possibility of ‘agribusiness normalisation’; however, it 
is likely to slow its onset. Meanwhile, a smaller core 
estate may mean that fewer households are displaced 
or disadvantaged by the establishment of the project – 
the single most important way to moderate its potential 
negative impacts.21
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The previous section focused on large-scale farms, 
which have been the subject of considerable 
international interest in recent years. However, Jayne et 
al. (2016) argue that the recent rise of medium-scale 
farms – which they define as farms of 5–100 hectares22 
– is quantitatively a much more important phenomenon 
in Africa. They quantify the spread of medium-scale 
farms in Ghana, Tanzania, Zambia and Kenya, with 
additional insights from Malawi. In Ghana, Tanzania and 
Zambia, the number and land share of such farms has 
been increasing rapidly since 2000, such that in Zambia 
there is now almost as much land cultivated on farms 
of 10–100 hectares as there is on farms of less than 5 
hectares.
The rise in the number of medium-scale farms is as 
yet only imperfectly understood, but appears to be 
driven by growing market opportunities, with rising 
urbanisation and higher agricultural prices over the past 
decade. The high and rising urbanisation rate in Ghana 
(54  percent in 2015, according to the 2016 World 
Development Indicators database) was noted in section 
4.1. Zambia’s urbanisation rate has been fairly static, 
at around 40 percent, since the 1980s, but for much 
of this period it has been among the highest in Africa – 
an early African case of urbanisation driven by natural 
resource rents, in this case from copper. Urbanisation is 
proceeding rapidly in Tanzania from a low base (up to 
32 percent in 2015). 
However, unlike in East Asia, these growing market 
opportunities are occurring in a context of relative 
land abundance. This means that some farms can 
expand to meet the rising demand, but also that new 
farms can be established to do so. What the rise of 
medium-scale farms is revealing is that some people 
are much better equipped to respond to the growing 
market opportunities than others. Despite the epithet 
‘emerging farmers’ that is sometimes used, initial 
evidence suggests that perhaps only 5 percent of the 
current medium-scale farmers have emerged from the 
ranks of smallholders. Instead, they are predominantly 
urban dwellers (often civil servants) who are choosing to 
invest in market-oriented agricultural production, plus 
rural elites (e.g. family members of chiefs) who have 
always enjoyed above-average landholdings (Jayne et 
al. 2016). This is, therefore, a story of elite capture23 of 
land as its value is observed to increase and as such 
displays similarities to the large-scale land acquisitions 
discussed in the previous section. Those obtaining the 
land have the human and social capital to negotiate the 
requisite procedures, and have also accumulated the 
financial capital to buy it. Jayne et al. (2016) observe 
that this elite capture of land is being facilitated by the 
transfer of land from customary tenure to ‘willingness 
to pay modes of land acquisition’ (Ibid.: 200) in all the 
countries concerned. This latter phenomenon is also 
observed in Malawi, which is much more land scarce 
than Ghana, Tanzania or Zambia.
Within Jayne et al.’s (2016) sample, Kenya provides 
an instructive and, in some ways, surprising contrast 
to Ghana, Tanzania and Zambia. In Kenya, first 
European then African elites laid claim to medium-
to-large allocations of productive land in the colonial 
and early post-colonial periods (Bates 1989). As a 
result, land allocation in the high-potential regions of 
Kenya is as unequal as in Latin America (World Bank 
2008). However, land in these regions is also largely 
claimed. As a result, Kenya – unlike Ghana, Tanzania 
and Zambia – witnessed a dramatic fall in the number 
of medium-scale farms over the period 1994–2006, as 
existing farms in both the 5-10 hectare and 10–100 
hectare categories were apparently subdivided. The 
additional twist to this story, though, is that the share 
of land accounted for by the remaining farms in the 10–
100 hectare category rose slightly, indicating a further 
consolidation at the top end of this distribution.
More research is required on the production systems of 
these medium-scale farms. Jayne et al. (2016) indicate, 
perhaps predictably, that such farms use their land less 
intensively than smallholders in the same countries. 
They also suggest that these medium-scale farms 
achieve returns per hectare that are similar to those 
achieved by smallholders. Returns per worker are 
much higher, however, because their production is less 
labour-intensive. Do these patterns reflect tightening 
rural labour markets, as discussed in relation to Ghana 
in section 4.1, or are such farms adopting modes of 
production that generate sub-optimal employment, 
given prevailing resource endowments?
THE RISE Of MEDIUM-SCALE 
fARMS
5.
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Meanwhile, Jayne et al. (2016) express concern at the 
lobbying power of the growing numbers of medium-
scale farmers, whose interests at best only partially 
overlap with those of smallholders. Two examples of this 
suffice. Over the past decade, the farm input subsidy 
programme in Zambia has consumed a sizeable share 
of the national agricultural budget, but the majority of 
benefits have been captured by medium-scale farmers 
(Mason et al. 2011). Stretching back almost 35 years, 
maize policy in Kenya has supported the modest 
number of surplus-producing medium-scale farms in 
the Rift Valley at the expense of deficit households (rural 
and urban, most of them poor) in the remainder of the 
country (Poulton and Kanyinga 2014; Jayne et al. 2008; 
Bates 1989).
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Although complementarities with livestock have been 
recognised, the focus of the discussion so far has 
clearly been on crops. This section briefly reviews the 
commercialisation of livestock systems as the structural 
transformation proceeds. 
The emphasis in this section is on how changes 
elsewhere in the economy – most notably, rising 
demand for livestock products as incomes rise, plus 
(eventually) the rising costs of rural labour – drive the 
commercialisation of livestock systems. Unlike for 
crops, and especially staple foods, few claims are 
made for the impact of livestock commercialisation on 
wider processes of structural transformation. This is 
because livestock typically accounts for a smaller share 
of agricultural GDP and labour than crops and also a 
smaller share of consumption expenditure, especially 
among poor households. Prices of livestock products, 
therefore, have less impact on the cost of living, wages 
and hence the potential competitiveness of industrial 
enterprises than the price of staple foods. 
However, interactions between crop and livestock 
enterprises are hugely important throughout the 
process of agricultural commercialisation. Early on, 
livestock are a major source of power and nutrients 
for crop production. Increasingly, livestock enterprises 
become a major source of demand for cereal crops 
as components of animal feed. In some communities, 
livestock enterprises also represent a leading avenue 
for accumulation for eventual investment in productive 
activities outside of agriculture.
As in previous sections, important distinctions are 
made according to population density. Table 1 presents 
trajectories for three stylised livestock systems – 
pastoralist, mixed agro-pastoral and (semi-) intensive – 
which it suggests are most commonly found in areas of 
low, medium and high population density respectively. 
As with all such categorisations in this paper, however, 
there are important exceptions. In particular, in East 
Africa, pastoralists can be found close to several major 
urban centres, including Nairobi, Adama in Ethiopia and 
most major towns in Somalia. 
The significance of the high-income elasticity of 
demand for livestock products as a driver of change 
within livestock systems in countries experiencing 
rapid economic growth was highlighted by Delgado 
et al. (1999). Since then, the proliferation of large-
scale commercial enterprises rearing chickens and 
pigs has been noted across Asia. Where population 
densities are high (as is commonly the case), these rely 
on purchased feed, much of which uses ingredients 
(maize, soybean) imported from the Americas. The 
increased demand for purchased animal feed in Asia 
is one factor commonly associated with the tightening 
of staple food markets (though not rice) that preceded 
the food price spike of 2007–08 (Tadesse et al. 2014; 
Piesse and Thirtle 2009). Meanwhile, consumption of 
poultry and pork has increased most dramatically in 
part because chicken and pigs exhibit a much lower 
feed conversion ratio than cattle, hence moderating 
the increase in consumer price as the transition to 
purchased animal feed has proceeded.
Where large-scale commercial enterprises have 
responded to the rapidly growing demand for livestock 
products, this has not completely displaced smallholder 
households, but it has altered their position within 
the relevant supply chains. For example, Xinchang, 
one of the largest suppliers of poultry meat in China, 
outsources close to half of its supplies to outgrowers 
close to its Shandong base (typically, old farmers with 
tiny plots, whose children have left for the city) who take 
day-old chicks and raise them to table weight in small 
barns.
The changes in mixed agro-pastoral systems in East 
Asia once the Lewis turning point had been passed 
were reviewed above with reference to Pingali (1997). 
Throughout South-East Asia, buffalos are also now 
being replaced by power tillers. By contrast, in 
Vietnam, where growth started later but has been very 
rapid, crop–livestock interactions remain important to 
commercialising smallholder production systems.
The author is unaware of examples of pastoralist systems 
in countries at an advanced stage in the structural 
transformation process. In East Africa, growing urban 
centres mean greater demand for livestock products, 
hence increased chances to profit from successful 
livestock enterprises, but also increased opportunities 
in other sectors. The maintenance of large herds is an 
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important strategy for dealing with drought, but access 
to water and pasture are significant constraints. Offtake 
rates continue to be modest. Increased use of contract 
herders is observed, but many profits may ultimately 
be invested in non-farm enterprises, rather than in 
expanding livestock herds.
Table 1: Livestock commercialisation trajectories by zone as structural transformation 
proceeds
Population density / remoteness / agro-ecological potential
Low (e.g. semi-arid lands) Medium High (e.g. <2 hours from 
major urban centre)
Low-wage, modest 
demand from urban 
markets
Pastoralist Mixed agro-pastoral
(grazing-based, limited 
offtake, stock of savings 
as well as production 
value)
Input into cropping 
intensifies (animal 
traction, manure),
some feeding
Semi-intensive or zero 
grazing
(dairy, chickens, pigs)
Rising wages, high 
demand from urban 
markets
More commercialised 
operations, increasing 
use of contract herding
Input into cropping 
gradually replaced 
by mechanisation or 
complemented by 
chemical fertilisers; 
increased reliance on 
livestock feed; eventually, 
greater specialisation of 
crop and livestock farms
Rise of larger-scale, 
commercial operations 
(zero-grazing) as demand 
for meat and dairy 
products rises with 
incomes
Source: Author’s own.
29Working Paper 06 | November 2017
This paper has defined agricultural commercialisation 
as occurring when agricultural enterprises and/or the 
agricultural sector as a whole rely increasingly on the 
market for the sale of produce and for the acquisition 
of production inputs, including labour. This definition 
encompasses two contrasting commercialisation 
dynamics:
•	 smallholder farm households shifting from 
semi-subsistence agriculture to production 
primarily for the market, in the process coming 
to rely increasingly heavily on purchased 
inputs and perhaps also labour in their 
production 
•	 smallholder farm households being 
complemented or replaced by medium- 
or large-scale farm enterprises that are 
predominantly or purely commercial in nature.
In areas of high population density, hence land scarcity, 
the first dynamic does not result in major changes to 
the agrarian structure during the early stages of the 
structural transformation. Rather, it is typically only 
a minority of smallholder households that are able to 
commercialise their agricultural activities. Successful 
commercialisation should lead to increased income, 
nutrition and other welfare indicators for household 
members, though not necessarily shared evenly 
between them. It may also generate increased casual 
employment for other rural residents. Some households 
will attempt to increase production for market and 
invest in additional purchased inputs in support of this 
objective, but if their efforts are not successful (due to 
adverse weather, disease or market conditions) they may 
sustain financial losses, with possible consequences for 
nutrition and other welfare indicators.
In the later stages of the structural transformation, 
agricultural commercialisation is increasingly driven 
by market forces in the non-farm economy, leading 
to major changes in the agrarian structure. The first 
commercialisation dynamic then gives way to the 
second.
APRA research will not observe market-driven 
consolidation of smallholder farms during the 
consortium’s lifetime. However, it will examine the 
impacts of the establishment of new medium- and 
large-scale farms among existing populations of 
smallholder households. The establishment of such 
farms represents agricultural commercialisation at the 
sector level, as medium- and large-scale farms produce 
predominantly or purely for market (unlike most 
smallholders) and rely more heavily on purchased inputs 
and hired labour than most smallholders do. Thus, 
the absolute level of market-oriented activity rises.26 
Even uncompetitive medium- and large-scale farms, 
which struggle for profitability and do not manage to 
scale up production and land use as anticipated, are 
likely to make incremental contributions to agricultural 
commercialisation at the sector level, assuming that 
they did not displace vibrant smallholder producers 
during their establishment.
By contrast, when examining initiatives designed to 
promote smallholder commercialisation, it is important 
to confirm that (and examine the extent to which) 
the initiatives have actually stimulated agricultural 
commercialisation before attributing observed welfare 
outcomes (good or bad) to such commercialisation. 
The remainder of this section briefly reviews a number of 
indicators for measuring smallholder commercialisation. 
All are intended as household-level indicators, although 
they could also be measured at area (e.g. district) or 
sector level. Indeed, APRA’s longitudinal studies, in 
particular, may wish to collect data at area level to 
complement available data at household level. In 
practice, the choice of indicators will often be a function 
of available data.
7.1  Share of production sold
With two important caveats, this is arguably the best 
indicator of agricultural commercialisation, as it flows 
directly from the definition above. A simple household 
commercialisation index (HCI) gives the degree of 
commercialisation as the percentage of crop production 
marketed (Leavy and Poulton 2007; Strasberg et al. 
1999):
HCI = (gross value of all crop sales / gross value of all 
crop production) * 100
A value of zero signifies total subsistence, and an 
index approaching 100 indicates higher degrees of 
commercialisation – i.e. a greater percentage of crop 
 INDICATORS Of AGRICULTURAL 
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production marketed. 
The first caveat is that this ‘simple’ index is actually 
quite data-intensive, requiring information on:
•	 the volumes of all crops that the household 
produced in a given season or year, 
including those that were produced for home 
consumption
•	 the sales value when crops were sold
•	 appropriate prices with which to value 
production that was consumed at home.
In household survey work, this may raise issues of 
respondent recall, as well as questions of professional 
judgement regarding the value of production that was 
consumed at home.
The second caveat is that the index makes no 
meaningful distinction between a farmer who produces 
just one bag of maize and sells that one bag, and one 
who grows 50 bags of maize and sells 30 of them. On 
the basis of this index the first farmer, with an HCI of 
100, would appear to be more commercialised than the 
second, who has an HCI of 60. In practice, smallholder 
households who grow more will often also sell more, 
albeit with variation according to household size and 
dependency ratios. The index is also problematic in 
that it does not distinguish distress sales of food crops 
by poor households (see section 2). Thus, apparently 
high scores on the commercialisation index, driven by 
sales of crops that are also eaten by the household yet 
are associated with low production volumes, should be 
examined as possible cases of distress sale. Distress 
sales are also likely to be associated with limited or 
no use of purchase inputs and/or adverse welfare 
indicators.
At crop or plot level, share of production sold 
could provide a possible indicator of agricultural 
commercialisation for intra-household analysis if the 
researcher was confident that:
•	 in relation to crops, within the local gendered 
division of labour, a particular crop was the 
responsibility of female household members 
and represented one of the main opportunities 
for produce sale for women
•	 in relation to plots, sampled plots were 
managed and controlled by women and 
comprised a representative sample of such 
plots.
7.2  Volume or value of production   
 sold
This is much less demanding of data than the HCI. 
If applied to cross-sectional data, it may conceal the 
degree of market orientation among certain small farms. 
However, it is less susceptible to the problem of distress 
sales than the HCI. Increases in this indicator within a 
given farm population over time are likely to be a reliable 
indicator of commercialisation.
Note that caution should be exercised in applying this 
indicator for single crops, rather than households. This 
is because households may switch between crops that 
they produce for market, according to changes in price, 
the local availability of crop-specific support services 
and other conditions. Therefore, rising production of a 
single crop may overstate trends in commercialisation 
among the smallholder population in question. This 
indicator should only be used if the researcher is 
confident that one crop dominates market-oriented 
production activity in a given locality.
7.3  Share of land devoted to crops  
 that are sold
This is a fairly crude indicator, in that it relies on 
being able to classify particular crops either as crops 
produced for market or for home consumption. This is 
straightforward for some crops, but not others. It may, 
however, provide some insight into commercialisation 
in situations where reliable data on crop sales are not 
available.
7.4  Quantity of inputs purchased
As discussed in section 3.4, this should not be the 
primary indicator of agricultural commercialisation. 
Instead, it should complement indicators (above) 
that assess engagement with the market for the sale 
of produce, to provide additional evidence of the 
commercialisation process. This is because increased 
use of purchased inputs is sometimes promoted (by 
external agencies) without establishing effective linkages 
to remunerative output markets. Some households may 
also purchase inputs using non-farm income sources, 
including remittances, without any intention of selling 
the resulting produce. 
Nevertheless, as increased use of purchased 
inputs is one of the major channels through which 
commercialisation enhances livelihood outcomes for 
producers, as well as for the wider economy, this is a 
good indicator to monitor.
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7.5  Quantity or value of labour   
 hired
Many of the comments about purchased inputs also 
apply to labour hire. This is a good indicator to monitor 
as it provides one of the major channels through which 
agricultural commercialisation enhances livelihood 
outcomes for households (often poorer households) 
that do not directly engage in the commercialisation 
process.
7.6  Indicators of livestock    
 commercialisation
Many livestock systems produce regular outputs. This 
is true of poultry production (for eggs or meat), dairy, 
fish farming, pigs and the fattening of cattle, sheep or 
goats. In these cases, commercialisation measures 
similar to those described for crops are appropriate. 
As market demand rises for chicken (meat), eggs or 
milk, local smallholder households may respond by 
increasing both production and the proportion of output 
that is sold as opposed to being consumed within 
the household. Where these activities are controlled 
by women, this may initially increase the income they 
earn. However, as with crops, as incomes from such 
activities rise, the likelihood of men investing and/or 
taking control rises. New commercial entrants are also 
likely to begin competing with smallholder producers.
As with crops, the amount spent on purchased inputs 
and the quantity or value of labour hired in are useful 
supplementary indicators of commercialisation for 
these livestock systems. Trends in such indicators can 
be monitored over time. Whereas for crops, it would 
be natural also to calculate the indicators on a per 
hectare basis, for livestock systems it might be more 
appropriate to calculate them in relation to the value 
of output.
It is more difficult to specify indicators for, or to 
reliably discern trends in, commercialisation of semi-
subsistence or pastoralist ruminant systems. In 
semi-subsistence systems, offtake rates for sale 
are low, because animals are valued for multiple 
outputs (draft power, manure, milk) and as a stock 
of savings. Individual sales may be associated with 
major consumption or investment needs within the 
household (e.g. a wedding or a funeral) and as such 
represent a drawing down of savings rather than the 
implementation of a commercial strategy. In pastoralist 
systems, there is a preoccupation with maintaining 
or growing the herd size over time and, in particular, 
ensuring that herds can withstand and/or recover from 
the effects of drought and other shocks. In the short 
term, increased offtake rates may reflect the need 
to sell animals (perhaps at reduced prices) as water 
becomes scarce. After a drought, offtake rates may be 
limited for a few years by the priority of rebuilding herd 
sizes. Thus, trends in commercialisation can only be 
discerned over long periods – perhaps possible within 
APRA’s longitudinal studies, but certainly not within the 
shorter panel studies.
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1 The paper, therefore, uses three discrete 
classifications to structure its arguments: 
small- vs medium- vs large-scale farms, early 
vs late stages of the structural transformation, 
and areas of low vs medium vs high 
population density. All three are heuristic 
tools and can most accurately be thought of 
as representing contrasting ranges on their 
respective spectrums. 
2  One indicator of how far a country 
has progressed through the structural 
transformation is the ratio of the labour force 
employed in manufacturing and services to 
the labour force in agriculture. This ratio is 
applicable whatever the detailed trajectory of 
the structural transformation in a particular 
context.
3  Meanwhile, as theorised as early as Fisher 
(1935) and Clark (1940), high-income 
economies such as the UK have diversified 
out of manufacturing into tradable services, 
such as financial services, tourism and 
leisure. These have a high income elasticity of 
demand at high income levels.
4  It could also be that a project seeks to 
promote commercialisation among particular 
household members, e.g. women, in which 
case commercialisation occurs when the 
marketed share of the output that they are 
responsible for rises.
5  von Braun and Kennedy (1994: 389) 
comment that, ‘There is a conscious effort by 
smallholder producers in all study settings to 
maintain subsistence food production along 
with new commercial production, despite 
apparently higher returns to land and labor 
from the cash crops. While cultural and 
taste factors may play a role, this reliance on 
food from own production under household 
control is a response to high transaction costs 
and risks related to market, employment, 
and production. It can largely be viewed as 
an insurance policy of farm households in 
response to a risky income environment. 
The higher the transactions costs are in food 
markets and the closer households are to 
food insecurity, such as in the extremely poor 
study environments of Rwanda and Malawi, 
the stronger is their preference for high shares 
of subsistence production…’
6  The other countries’ scores are as follows: 
Nigeria = 1.06 (2007), Malawi = 0.56 (2013), 
Zimbabwe = 0.52 (2011), Tanzania = 0.49 
(2014), Ethiopia = 0.37 (2013).
7  We do not consider pastoralist systems and 
their commercialisation in this paper.
8  Headey and Jayne (2014) categorise African 
countries as high or low population density 
according to whether they are above or below 
this threshold. However, many countries 
include regions of both high and low agro-
ecological potential, as well as urban areas. 
9  Historically, however, the world rice market 
was thin and highly volatile, so most Asian 
countries in the second half of the twentieth 
century relied heavily on domestic production 
of rice and partially insulated domestic prices 
from world prices (Cummings et al. 2006).
10  Attempts to define smallholder, medium-scale 
and large-scale farms inevitably confront the 
challenge that some agricultural activities are 
more land-intensive, but less labour-intensive 
or capital-intensive than others. Horticultural 
and floricultural production are relatively 
labour- and capital-intensive, often requiring 
continual tending of plants, regular application 
of fertiliser, plus irrigation and perhaps also 
tunnels or greenhouses. However, they 
can generate multiple crops through the 
year and high returns per hectare of land. A 
three-hectare floricultural operation may be 
considered medium-scale while 50 hectares 
is large. At the other end of the spectrum, 
livestock-keeping in semi-arid environments 
may require several hectares per cow. 
However, despite these clear limitations to 
defining farm scale primarily in terms of land 
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area, there are no easy alternatives, especially 
given available farm-level data. This paper, 
therefore, follows the dominant practice and 
refers primarily to land area. For example, 
Jayne et al. (2016) define medium-scale 
farms as those between 5 and 100 hectares, 
implying that large-scale farms are 100 
hectares or more in size. 
11  Barham et al. (1995) present a model in 
which large-scale farms – which are better 
able to withstand cyclical fluctuations in 
commodity markets than smallholder farms 
and which also have better access to capital 
– are able to buy up land from destitute 
smallholders following covariant shocks. 
However, this model starts with a dualistic 
agrarian structure and does not seek to 
explain its origins.
12  Tyler (2007b) argues that, once the land has 
been prepared, it may be most efficiently 
farmed by large-scale family farms, rather 
than estate farms, due to their superior labour 
motivation.
13  Other unsustainable attempts to promote 
large-scale agriculture, including the infamous 
groundnut scheme in southern Tanzania, are 
documented by Tyler (2007c).
14  Note that this does not mean that all 
smallholders outcompete large-scale farms. 
There are major variations in productivity 
across smallholder producers of any 
given crop, as might be expected from 
our recognition of ‘three rural worlds’ in 
section 3.1. However, if a sufficient number 
of smallholders can produce a crop at low 
cost, this may prevent large-scale farms 
from establishing and/or sustaining profitable 
production of the crop in question.
15  They also note the heyday of state farms 
during the late 1960s and 1970s, although 
their data points do not coincide with this 
period. State farms proved no more capable 
of competing with smallholders than private 
large-scale farms.
16  Permanent jobs may be created in 
associated processing activities, but these 
could equally accompany large-scale or 
smallholder production systems.
17  In a similar vein, Hichaambwa and Matenga 
(2016) compare three examples of agricultural 
commercialisation in Zambia. One of these is 
a block of established medium- and large-
scale farms, while another is an outgrower 
scheme. They suggest that the former 
generates more employment than the latter, 
in which only a limited number of smallholders 
are able to participate. However, it is not clear 
how comparable their three cases are.
18  At cross-country level within Africa, this is 
illustrated by the fact that much of the land 
included in recent large-scale land deals is 
found in 6–8 countries (Deininger and Byerlee 
2012; Schoneveld 2014), significant parts 
of which have low population density. When 
assessing future land availability, Deininger 
and Byerlee (2012) use a cut-off of 25 
persons per km,2 which is much lower than 
the figure of 100 persons per km2 that was 
discussed in section 3.
19  It is a defining feature of the early stages of 
the structural transformation that sufficient 
employment is not being created in urban 
areas to absorb labour displaced by radical 
changes in agrarian organisation.
20  This report is not restricted to African cases, 
although these are the largest group within 
the Land Matrix database.
21  The optimal size of core estate will vary 
according to the crop being grown. This is an 
important topic for research. 
22  The inherent difficulties of classifying 
farm types based on hectarage were 
acknowledged in note 10. At the bottom end 
of this range, one might argue that the 5-10 
hectare band is likely to include a significant 
proportion of ‘top end’ smallholders, 
especially in land-abundant areas. On the 
other hand, the figures in Table 4 of Jayne et 
al. (2016: 204) show that trends in numbers 
and land shares of farms of 5–10 hectares 
are more similar to trends for farms of 10–20 
hectares than to trends for ‘smallholder’ farms 
of less than 5 hectares.
23  Some might argue that this is a fairly elastic 
usage of the term ‘elite’. Those establishing 
medium-scale farm enterprises do include 
MPs (political elites), senior district agricultural 
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officials (bureaucrats, but in some countries 
well-entrenched within major political parties, 
hence often counted by political economists 
as being among ‘local elites’) and low-to-
medium ranking civil servants within national 
agencies. They also include entrepreneurs 
and a multitude of other urban professionals, 
including university lecturers and researchers! 
These people would simply be ‘middle 
classes’ in many other countries, but at 
present are still among the top decile by 
wealth and income in most African countries 
(Birdsall et al. 2011).
24  The author is indebted to Steve Wiggins and 
Andy Catley for insights and contributions 
towards this section.
25  This section draws heavily on Leavy and 
Poulton (2007).
26  Theoretically, this could be more than 
compensated for by a decline in market-
oriented activity among the existing 
smallholder population, if, for example, the 
latter were outcompeted in markets by 
the new entrants and retreated back into 
subsistence production. However, the paper 
has argued that this is highly unlikely.
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